UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24872
30 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, on 30 November 1992, in connection with the item entitled "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping":

"The members of the Security Council had continued the examination of the Secretary-General's report entitled "An Agenda for Peace" (S/24111).

"The members of the Security Council welcome and support the proposals in paragraph 25 of "An Agenda for Peace" on fact-finding. They are of the view that an increased resort to fact-finding as a tool of preventive diplomacy, in accordance with the Charter and General Assembly Declaration on Fact-Finding (resolution 46/59), particularly its guidelines, can result in the best possible understanding of the objective facts of a situation which will enable the Secretary-General to meet his responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter and facilitate Security Council deliberations. They agree that various forms of fact-finding can be employed according to the requirements of a situation, and that a request by a State for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to its territory should be considered without undue delay. They encourage all Member States in a position to do so to provide the Secretary-General with the detailed information needed on issues of concern, so as to facilitate effective preventive diplomacy.

"The members of the Security Council, being aware of the increased responsibilities of the United Nations in the area of preventive diplomacy, invite the Secretary-General to consider the appropriate measures necessary to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat for information gathering and in-depth analysis. They also invite the Member States and the Secretary-General to consider the secondment of experts to help in this regard. They urge the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures to ensure the availability at short notice of eminent persons who might share, with senior officials of the Secretariat, the burden of fact-finding missions. They note the positive role of regional

organizations and arrangements in fact-finding within their areas of competence and welcome its intensification and close coordination with fact-finding efforts by the United Nations.

"Bearing in mind the Declaration on Fact-Finding and the Secretary-General's recommendations in 'An Agenda for Peace', the members of the Security Council for their part will facilitate and encourage every appropriate use of fact-finding missions on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

"In this context, the members of the Security Council note and endorse the Secretary-General's view that in some cases a fact-finding mission can help defuse a dispute or situation, indicating to those concerned that the United Nations and in particular the Security Council is actively seized of the matter as a present or potential threat to international peace and security. Such action in the early stages of a potential dispute can be particularly effective. They welcome the Secretary-General's readiness to make full use of his powers under Article 99 of the Charter to draw the attention of the Security Council to any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security. They note with satisfaction the recent greater use of fact-finding missions, as exemplified by the missions to Moldova, Nagorny-Karabakh, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

"The members of the Security Council intend to continue their work on the Secretary-General's report as indicated in the President's statement of 29 October 1992 (S/24728)."

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24873
30 November 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon the instructions of my Government, in connection with Security Council resolution 792 (1992) on Cambodia which was adopted on 30 November 1992, I would like to convey to you the position of the Royal Thai Government on the matter (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would kindly arrange for this letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nitya PIBULSONGGRAM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Position of the Royal Thai Government with regard to Security Council resolution 792 (1992) on Cambodia

1. Thailand as a neighbouring country wishes to see genuine and lasting peace in Cambodia which will not only return normalcy to the border areas but will also create stability and prosperity to the region as a whole.

2. Genuine and lasting peace in Cambodia can be brought about only through the participation of all Cambodian parties in the peace process. Thailand has therefore supported all efforts to persuade the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) to comply with its obligations under the Paris Agreements and feels that the door should not be closed to negotiation with the PDK.

3. Thailand shares the view of the Secretary-General in his latest report (document S/24800 dated 15 November 1992) that "patient diplomacy" was the best means of getting the peace process back on track.

4. On the specific measures cited in Security Council resolution 792 (1992), Thailand is of the opinion that these measures must be realistic, implementable and consistent with the realities of the present situation. As a member in good standing of the United Nations, Thailand will comply with measures that may have effect on Thailand so long as these measures do not contravene Thai law or Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, in devising detailed plans for the implementation of specific measures, neighbouring countries should be closely consulted in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations.

5. With regard to the question of border checkpoints referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 792 (1992), Thailand is of the view that such checkpoints must be established strictly in accordance with the terms of the Paris Agreements. Article VII, paragraph 3 (a) of the Agreements stipulates that checkpoints shall be established "along the routes and at selected locations along the Cambodian side of the border and at airfields inside Cambodia." Previous Security Council resolutions including resolution 783 (1992) of 13 October 1992 also referred to the "checkpoints in the country (Cambodia) and along its borders with neighbouring countries."

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24874
1 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of fresh Kuwaiti violations of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement and the instructions given for the implementation of that agreement in the demilitarized zone.

1. At 0600 hours on 13 October 1992, a Kuwaiti engineering unit, consisting of five excavators and four large vehicles, was seen at geographical coordinates 6130 levelling former tank positions and removing debris from them.

2. At 1700 hours on 14 October 1992, the two officers named below left the post of Talhah at geographical coordinates 452313, in possession of a 9 mm Tariq revolver No. 0313121010, in order to collect firewood from in front of the above post, opposite the Kuwaiti post of Sukhayriyat at geographical coordinates 448299, and were abducted by the Kuwaiti side. They are Corporal Imad Hamza Hussein and Warrant Officer Ali Muhammad Kazim.

3. At 2020 hours on 14 October 1992, individuals from the Kuwaiti post opposite the Jarishan centre at geographical coordinates 045172 fired several shots at the above Iraqi centre.

4. At 0800 hours on 18 October 1992, a Kuwaiti engineering unit, consisting of three excavators, was observed in operation at geographical coordinates 6232.

5. At 1200 hours on 3 November 1992, three Kuwaiti police craft fired at Iraqi fishermen who were fishing near Hajjam island, opposite Warbah island, and arrested them. The fishermen concerned are Jawad, Sa'id, Samir, Mahdi and Fouad from the village of Zubayr, and Karim Ahmad Khudhayr, Sayyid Ali and his father from the village of Khur Zubayr. The Kuwaiti police also seized the six fishing boats belonging to the above individuals and took them to Warbah island.

6. At 1330 hours on 11 November 1992, a Kuwaiti patrol in a white pick-up vehicle approached from the coastal road towards the naval base within

international boundaries. When it was seen by the observer patrol, it returned towards the Kuwaiti rear.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24875
1 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 25 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and with reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait addressed to you and issued as Security Council document S/24806, I should like to state the following:

1. The two incubators mentioned are unfit for use and had been removed from maintenance storage at the time, as they were in need of repair and had a sheet of paper affixed to them, stamped by the maintenance department of the Kuwaiti Ministry of Health, which stated that they were out of order and needed servicing.

2. A news team, consisting of the CNN television network, Agence France Presse, Associated Press, United Press and Radio Monte Carlo, actually saw the incubators in the Kuwaiti hospitals and witnessed the health staff caring for the sleeping children. Film and sound recordings of this were immediately made after the lies concerning the incubators were proclaimed in the United States Congress, where the above media gave accounts of what they had seen before the whole world.

3. The purpose of removing the said incubators was to repair, service and subsequently return them.

4. The Iraqi side has every intention of handing over Kuwaiti property, irrespective of the propaganda tricks and cheap allegations resorted to by the Kuwaiti side to cover up the scandal unveiled as a result of the dramatic allegations made by the Kuwaiti ambassador's daughter that she had seen, with her own eyes, the incubators being removed, even though they were not actually in Kuwait at the time. The scandal cannot therefore be covered up by casting about for instances such as these.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
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S/24876
1 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of further violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft for the purpose of observation and provocation during the period from 18 to 24 November 1992, during which period the said aircraft also dropped heat flares in some regions of northern Iraq, as follows:

Date		Details
18/19 November 1992	(a)	Northern region: 28 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 7,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.
	(b)	Southern region: 48 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 7,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Nasiriyah, Samarra, Shatrah, Qurnah, Jabaliyah and Busayyah.
19/20 November 1992	(a)	Northern region: 24 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 5,500 to 8,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.
	-	At 1548 hours on 19 November 1992 two United States aircraft dropped 10 flares on an area situated 10 kilometres north-east of Mosul.
	(b)	Southern region: 67 sorties flown by F-4, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds ranging from 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 8,000 metres. The flights were

Date		Details
		concentrated over the regions of Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Amarah, Khidr, Qurnah, Artawi and Busayyah.
20/21 November 1992	(a)	Northern region: 10 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 6,000 to 9,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.
	-	At 1050 hours on 20 November 1992 a formation of two aircraft dropped five heat flares on an area situated 25 kilometres south of Dohuk.
	(b)	Southern region: 24 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 7,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Basra, Amarah, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Busayyah and Artawi.
21/22 November 1992	(a)	Northern region: No activity was recorded over the region during this period.
	(b)	Southern region: 61 sorties flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 3,500 to 7,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Jabaliyah and Busayyah.
	-	A TR-1 aircraft conducted hostile reconnaissance from an altitude of 20,000 metres, entering the southern region at 1224 hours and leaving it at 1415 hours on 21 November 1992.
22/23 November 1992	(a)	Northern region: 24 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 5,000 to 6,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah.
	(b)	Southern region: 106 sorties flown by F-4, F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 9,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Artawi and Shatrah.

Date	Details
23/24 November 1992	(a) Northern region: 22 sorties at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 6,500 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Zakho, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.
	(b) Southern region: 21 sorties flown by F-4, F-14, and F-15 at speeds ranging from 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes ranging from 4,000 to 9,000 metres. The flights were concentrated over the regions of Amadiyah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Busayyah, Salman, Qurnah and Qal'at Salih.
	- At 1520 hours on 23 November 1992 two United States aircraft dropped eight heat flares on parts of the region of Salamiyah in the Governorate of Ninawa.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24877
1 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With reference to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations, of 25 November 1992 (S/24856) to your predecessor, I have the honour to draw your attention to the following:

1. My Government finds it particularly surprising that in the above letter Security Council resolution 787 (1992) has been interpreted as one directed at the strict implementation of sanctions exclusively against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I do not wish to reply at this time to the allegations about the Serbian authorities' "involvement in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Since in the letter reference was made to the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would only like to recall Security Council resolution 787 (1992), which, in its paragraph 5, demanded, inter alia, that "all forces, in particular elements of the Croatian army, be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded or disarmed".

2. Security Council resolution 713 (1991) imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the territory of the former Yugoslavia. These provisions have been reaffirmed in all subsequent relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including resolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992).

The monitoring and inspection of merchant shipping is not therefore confined only to vessels sailing to or from the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In accordance with resolution 713 (1991), those measures apply to the vessels destined to or from all Adriatic ports of the former Yugoslavia, including those of Croatia. This has also been confirmed by the Ministers of the Western European Union at the meeting held in Rome on 20 November 1992 (S/24847).

It is evident from the provisions of the Security Council resolutions concerning the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia that all merchant ships sailing to or from Croatian territorial waters must equally be monitored and inspected. Therefore, if any guidelines were to be adopted in this respect, they would have to take into account that the arms embargo was imposed on all republics of the former Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24878
1 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EGYPT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to write to you concerning the situation in Somalia.

The Egyptian Government has accepted to participate in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) peace-keeping operation. An Egyptian contingent is currently undertaking the necessary preparations for deployment in Somalia within the next few weeks.

It would therefore be desirable that the Security Council and the Secretariat maintain timely consultations with Egypt, as a troop-contributing nation, on all aspects relating to the mandate of UNOSOM.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nabil ELARABY
Permanent Representative

92-76540 4401a (E) 011292 011292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24879
2 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANGOLA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the letter addressed by Mr. Pedro de Castro Van-Dunem "Loy", Minister of External Relations of Angola to Mrs. Margaret Anstee, your Special Representative, and to request that it be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Afonso VAN-DUNEM "MBINDA"
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 30 November 1992 from the Minister of External Relations of Angola addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola

The Angolan Government and I personally are deeply concerned about the occurrences of last weekend in the Province of Uige, above all because they took place immediately after the Namibe Declaration, which, in our opinion, constituted a reference point in the search for mutual trust that is essential to the solution of the present Angolan crisis.

I must stress that we consider it advisable to give to Mr. Jonas Savimbi's organization and to him personally one more opportunity to demonstrate, in practical and specific terms, their desire to cooperate not only with the Government, but also with the United Nations, to reinstate the Bicesse Accords and, for this very reason, despite the scepticism with which we always face the desire for dialogue and peace repeatedly uttered by the leaders of UNITA, we sent a government delegation to Namibe for contacts with that organization.

We are all quite used to UNITA's tactics and to its inability to respect the commitments that it makes, but it must be stressed that this time the organization in question has exceeded all expectations by violating, on the following day, the Namibe Declaration, with the attack that its army carried out against a vehicle of the Angolan armed forces (FAA) 45 km from Luanda, in the locality of Panguila without justification.

This attack, moreover, was a matter of a provocation, whereby UNITA intended to justify, in case of reaction by the government forces, an operation aimed at the seizure and occupation of the cities of Uige and Negage, which it had been preparing for quite some time according to complaints previously made by the national authorities.

I must stress that, in one way or another, UNITA would carry out these actions, as they would be part of its offensive military plan whereby it intended at least to impose anti-democratic solutions on the Government or to try again to take power by force.

It is therefore not surprising, that, in its usual fashion, UNITA should have advised you that the origin of these confrontations is an alleged incident between the police and a vehicle that was transporting military personnel of that party.

Even if it had been so, I would like to call your attention to the fact that a minor incident cannot call into question an entire process that involves a whole nation.

It must also be stressed that the magnitude of the occurrences in Uige and Negage demonstrates clearly that it is not a matter of a spontaneous reaction to some alleged incident.

In addition to this, another proof that nothing of what UNITA is doing at this time is casual is the fact that it simultaneously destroyed several major bridges in the provinces of Malange and Kuanza Norte that are more than 400 km from the location where UNITA alleges the incident to have occurred.

In addition, the difficulties of communication that Mr. Jonas Savimbi has been invoking to push aside the war-like actions of his troops are fallacious and dangerous to the extent that they may lead the international community to evaluate the situation incorrectly and not take the positions demanded by the reality of the facts.

Also, in statements made to Vorgan this weekend, Mr. Jonas Savimbi again took up the positions he had assumed on 3 October 1992, which gave rise to the present Angolan crisis, in a clear affront to the commitments he made to you on 24 November 1992, in Huambo.

(Signed) Pedro de Castro VAN-DUNEM "LOY"
Minister of External Relations
of Angola

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24880
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992 and 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992,

Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response,

Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Gravely alarmed by the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia and underlining the urgent need for the quick delivery of humanitarian assistance in the whole country,

Noting the efforts of the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, and in particular the proposal made by its Chairman at the forty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly for the organization of an international conference on Somalia, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other regional agencies and arrangements to promote reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia and to address the humanitarian needs of the people of that country,

Commending the ongoing efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations and of non-governmental organizations and of States to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Responding to the urgent calls from Somalia for the international community to take measures to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including reports of violence and threats of violence against personnel participating lawfully in impartial humanitarian relief activities; deliberate attacks on non-combatants, relief consignments and vehicles, and medical and relief facilities; and impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population,

Dismayed by the continuation of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Somalia, and in particular reports of looting of relief supplies destined for starving people, attacks on aircraft and ships bringing in humanitarian relief supplies, and attacks on the Pakistani UNOSOM contingent in Mogadishu,

Taking note with appreciation of the letters of the Secretary-General of 24 November 1992 (S/24859) and of 29 November 1992 (S/24868),

Sharing the Secretary-General's assessment that the situation in Somalia is intolerable and that it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, and that UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia,

Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992),

Noting the offer by Member States aimed at establishing a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible,

Determined further to restore peace, stability and law and order with a view to facilitating the process of a political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at national reconciliation in Somalia, and encouraging the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue and intensify their work at the national and regional levels to promote these objectives,

Recognizing that the people of Somalia bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and the reconstruction of their own country,

1. Reaffirms its demand that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease hostilities, maintain a cease-fire throughout the country, and cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below in order to promote the process of relief distribution, reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia;

2. Demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to facilitate the efforts of the United Nations, its specialized agencies and humanitarian organizations to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected population in Somalia;

3. Also demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia take all measures necessary to ensure the safety of United Nations and all other personnel engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the military forces to be established pursuant to the authorization given in paragraph 10 below;

4. Further demands that all parties, movements and factions in Somalia immediately cease and desist from all breaches of international humanitarian law including from actions such as those described above;

5. Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law occurring in Somalia, including in particular the deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and medical supplies essential for the survival of the civilian population, and affirms that those who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;

6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; and requests him to keep the Council informed and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate for the fulfilment of its mandate where conditions permit;

7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible;

8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment;

9. Welcomes also offers by other Member States to participate in that operation;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;

11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in accordance with paragraph 10 above and requests the Secretary-General to establish a fund through which the contributions, where appropriate, could be channelled to the States or operations concerned;

12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces involved, which will reflect the offer referred to in paragraph 8 above;

13. Requests the Secretary-General and the Member States acting under paragraph 10 above to establish appropriate mechanisms for coordination between the United Nations and their military forces;

14. Decides to appoint an ad hoc commission composed of members of the Security Council to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution;

15. Invites the Secretary-General to attach a small UNOSOM liaison staff to the Field Headquarters of the unified command;

16. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, calls upon States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures as may be necessary to ensure strict implementation of paragraph 5 of resolution
733 (1992);

17. Requests all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by States, nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions;

18. Requests the Secretary-General and, as appropriate, the States concerned to report to the Council on a regular basis, the first such report to be made no later than fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution, on the implementation of this resolution and the attainment of the objective of establishing a secure environment so as to enable the Council to make the necessary decision for a prompt transition to continued peace-keeping operations;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a plan to the Council initially within fifteen days after the adoption of this resolution to ensure that UNOSOM will be able to fulfil its mandate upon the withdrawal of the unified command;

20. Invites the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Somalia;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24881
2 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KAZAKHSTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a declaration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, dated 26 October 1992, on the events in Tajikistan.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the Declaration circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. ARYSTANBEKOVA
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Kazakhstan
to the United Nations

92-76895 3649f (E) 021292 021292

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Annex

Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan on the events in Tajikistan

The events in Tajikistan have undergone a further dangerous development. On 24 October one of the opposing groups occupied a number of government buildings and announced a change of power in the country. According to a statement by the group's leaders, the object of their action is the restoration in the Republic of the power existing prior to May 1992. The situation in the country remains unclear and contradictory in many respects. Tension has dramatically increased throughout the Republic; armed clashes, which have virtually degenerated into civil war, are taking place in and around Dushanbe; the territorial integrity of Tajikistan has come under serious threat. Conditions for the early delivery even of humanitarian aid to those in need are not assured.

We cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in the immediate vicinity of our borders. Kazakhstan has stood and continues to stand against the use of force in resolving any disputes and for their settlement by peaceful, political means. Our Government has repeatedly appealed to the parties to the conflict in Tajikistan to put an end to bloodshed and to take their seat at the negotiating table. Together with other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Kazakhstan has taken active part in the peacemaking efforts. However, these have failed to yield the desired result and events have now taken a new turn fraught with unpredictable consequences.

To determine what power, what leadership it wants to have in its own country is the exclusive right of the Tajik people.

It is our wish that peace and tranquillity may reign and legality may triumph in Tajikistan. The first condition for this is civil harmony. The leadership of Kazakhstan is once again appealing to the diverse political groupings in Tajikistan to embark upon a productive political dialogue.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24882
2 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Chairman of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States for the current month and to advise you that the Group issued a declaration on the events which took place in Venezuela on Friday, 27 November 1992.

May I request that the text of the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Lionel A. HURST
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Declaration

The members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States strongly condemn the events which took place in Venezuela on Friday, 27 November 1992. The members of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States reaffirm their support for the democratic process in Venezuela and throughout the region.

We express our solidarity with the people and Government of Venezuela and, in particular, its constitutional President, Carlos Andres Peres, and applaud them for successfully overcoming the attempt to thwart the democratic process.

Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Kitts and Nevis
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24883
2 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 2 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF QATAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As Chairman of the Arab Group for December, I have the honour to express support for the efforts aimed at the adoption of a new international plan to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid in Somalia. We should also like to express our support for the request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the approval of a new operation in Somalia under the United Nations Charter, particularly Chapter VII thereof, and to state that this force should be managed and supervised by the United Nations.

I should equally like to affirm the importance of undertaking, in cooperation with the relevant regional organizations, political and diplomatic initiatives to coincide with the military operation with a view to commencing a fruitful dialogue in which the concerned parties and the disputing factions in Somalia take part, the aim being to achieve a national reconciliation guaranteeing peace, regional unity and sovereignty for Somalia.

We also request the Security Council to intensify international efforts to consider effective ways and means of rebuilding Somalia.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Hussain AL-NI'MAH
Permanent Representative of Qatar
Chairman of the Arab Group

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24884
2 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After consultations held on 2 December 1992, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the media on behalf of the members of the Council:

"The members of the Security Council wish to express their deep concern and outrage about the increasing number of attacks against United Nations personnel serving in various peace-keeping operations.

"A number of serious incidents affecting military and civilian personnel serving with UNAVEM II, UNTAC and UNPROFOR have occurred during the last few days.

"On 29 November in Uige, northern Angola, a Brazilian police observer with UNAVEM II was killed as a result of an outbreak of hostilities between UNITA and government forces, during which the UNAVEM camp was caught in the cross-fire. The members of the Council convey their deep sympathy and condolences to the Government of Brazil and to the bereaved family,

"The situation in UNPROFOR, which has already suffered over 300 casualties, 20 of them fatal, remains deeply troubling. On 30 November, two Spanish UNPROFOR soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina were seriously injured in a mine attack and a Danish UNPROFOR soldier was abducted by armed men today.

"On 1 December, two British UNTAC military observers and four naval observers, two from the Philippines, one from New Zealand and one from the United Kingdom, on patrol in Kompong Thom province were illegally detained by forces belonging to the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK). An UNTAC helicopter, sent to assist in the discussions for their release, was fired upon, and a French military observer on board was injured. Moreover, today, six UNTAC civilian police monitors, three Indonesians, two Tunisians and one Nepalese, were injured in two land mine incidents in Siem Reap province.

"The members of the Council condemn these attacks on the safety and security of UN personnel and demand that all parties concerned take all necessary measures to prevent their recurrence. The members of the Council consider the abduction and detention of United Nations peace-keeping personnel as totally unacceptable and demand the immediate and unconditional release of the UNTAC and UNPROFOR personnel concerned."

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24885
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 28 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's note SCPC/1/92(12). The Permanent Representative would like to inform the Secretary-General that under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government there are no petroleum or petroleum products or funds of the Government of Iraq, or of its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products subject to the provisions of Security Council resolution 778 (1992).

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24886
3 December 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note verbale SCPC/1/92(12), has the honour to inform him that France holds no Iraqi Government assets such as those covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992) of 2 October 1992.

92-77057 3661h (E) 031292 031292

031292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24887
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and in reply to the latter's note SCPC/1/92(12) dated 26 October 1992, has the honour to communicate the following:

1. In the Republic of Bulgaria there are no funds of the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations, or agencies, that represent the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products.

2. In the Republic of Bulgaria there are no petroleum or petroleum products owned by the Government of Iraq, or its State bodies, corporations, or agencies.

92-77063 3774d (E) 031292 031292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24888
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AUSTRIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and referring to his note SCPC/1/92(12) dated 26 October 1992, has the honour to communicate the following:

1. The Austrian Government has no information relating to the existence in Austria of any funds falling under paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 778 (1992). Inquiries about funds representing the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products have been complicated by the lack of any legal obligation under Austrian law that would require banks to register the nature of the commercial transactions which are at the origin of any deposits made with them.

2. Investigations concerning petroleum or petroleum products falling under paragraph 2 of resolution 778 (1992) have shown that no such products are presently stocked in Austria.

92-77069 3693j (E) 031292 031292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24889
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF SINGAPORE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the latter's note SCPC/192(12) dated 26 October 1992 regarding resolution 778 (1992) adopted by the Security Council at its 3117th meeting on 2 October 1992.

The Permanent Representative further has the honour to inform the Secretary-General that there are no Iraqi-owned petroleum or petroleum products under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of Singapore.

92-77075 3652f (E) 031292 031292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24890
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 1 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to his note SCPC/1/92(12) regarding holdings of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products or funds of the Government of Iraq, or of its State bodies, corporations or agencies, that represent the proceeds of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products subject to the provisions of resolution 778 (1992).

The Permanent Representative of Ireland wishes to inform the Secretary-General that the Irish authorities are in a position to certify that no such funds, petroleum or petroleum products are currently held in Ireland.

92-77081 3922b (E) 031292 031292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24891
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 1 DECEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE NETHERLANDS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note SCPC/1/92(12) of 26 October 1992 concerning Security Council resolution 778 (1992), has the honour to inform the Secretary-General as follows.

The Kingdom of the Netherlands has, within the confines of its legislation, conducted an inquiry into the presence under its jurisdiction of funds, petroleum and petroleum products as referred to in the Secretary-General's note of 26 October 1992.

From the investigation conducted, it did not appear that such funds, petroleum or petroleum products are currently present under the jurisdiction of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom of the Netherlands will continue to pay careful attention to this matter.

92-77087 3657h (E) 031292 031292

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24892
3 December 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ)

INTRODUCTION

1. In my report of 9 October 1992 (S/24624), I conveyed to the Security Council the principal features of the general peace agreement for Mozambique, which is contained in document S/24635, and brought to its attention the role proposed for the United Nations in relation to the peace process. I recommended an immediate plan of action. On 13 October 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 782 (1992), by which it welcomed the signature of a general peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Résistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to Mozambique of a team of up to 25 military observers, and requested the Secretary-General to report on the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), including in particular a detailed estimate of the cost of that operation.

I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PEACE PROCESS

2. In pursuance of that resolution, I took action the same day to appoint Mr. Aldo Ajello, a national of Italy and a staff member of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as my interim Special Representative for Mozambique, and asked him to proceed to Maputo to assist the parties in setting up the joint machinery, which was to be chaired by the United Nations, in finalizing the modalities and conditions for the military arrangements and in carrying out the various other actions that were required of them at the very beginning of the process. I also entrusted him with the functions described in paragraphs 14 and 15 of my report of 9 October 1992 to the Security Council (S/24642). At the same time, I made arrangements to send to Mozambique a military team whose personnel had been drawn from existing peace-keeping missions and whose limited tasks were described in paragraph 16 of the above-mentioned report.

3. The interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day when the general peace agreement (hereinafter referred to as "the agreement") came into force, following publication in the Official Gazette of the legal instruments adopted by the Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique. On 20 October 1992, two teams of military observers were also deployed to Nampula and Beira.

4. Since his arrival, the interim Special Representative has met on several occasions with the President of Mozambique, Mr. Chissano, as well as with Mr. Dhlakama, President of RENAMO, and has had extensive exchanges with both leaders on various matters related to the early start of implementation of the agreement. He has also met with members of the Mozambican Government and representatives of RENAMO, representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the ambassadors of the mediator State (Italy) and of the observer States at the Rome talks (France, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America), as well as with other members of the diplomatic community in Maputo. He has, in addition, discussed aspects relating to the implementation of the agreement with representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes and major non-governmental organizations that are currently involved in humanitarian relief effort in Mozambique and that are called upon to assist in carrying out related aspects of the agreement.

5. I am pleased to report that both the Government of Mozambique and the leadership of RENAMO, as well as representatives of the diplomatic community in Mozambique, have expressed their appreciation for the prompt action taken by the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

6. Both parties have committed themselves to undertake immediately after, and in some instances before, the entry into effect of the agreement, specific action to set in motion the joint mechanisms to monitor and verify its implementation. However, no such action had been initiated at the time when the interim Special Representative arrived in Mozambique. Nor had the parties been in direct contact since the signature of the agreement, and RENAMO had no official delegation in the capital. The RENAMO delegation did not wish to move from its headquarters in Gorongosa to Maputo until the Government had provided adequate logistic support, i.e. appropriate housing, transport and communication facilities as foreseen in the agreement. This logistic problem, seemingly marginal, turned out to be a major impediment to the early establishment of the monitoring and verification machinery. Meanwhile, major violations of the cease-fire were reported in various areas of the country, and the parties presented official complaints to the interim Special Representative. A large military operation was reportedly undertaken by RENAMO, which occupied one major town, Angoche, and the villages of Maganja da Costa, Memba and Lugela.

7. In the absence of the machinery foreseen in the agreement for the verification of alleged violations, the interim Special Representative has not been in a position to investigate these incidents. He offered to send United Nations military observers into the areas where military operations had taken place, but this was not possible for lack of agreement between the two

parties. I brought these matters to the attention of the Security Council in my letter of 23 October 1992 to its President. The President, in a statement dated 27 October 1992 (S/24719), expressed the Council's deep concern about the reports of major violations of the cease-fire, called upon the parties to halt such violations immediately and urged them to cooperate fully with the interim Special Representative.

8. In order to avoid the escalation of violations, the interim Special Representative called for an informal meeting of the two parties. In a personal letter, he urged Mr. Dhlakama to attend such a meeting, the unsolved logistics problems notwithstanding. He also made a public appeal to both parties. The initiative was successful, and both the Government and RENAMO sent high-level delegations to attend their first meeting in Maputo.

9. Thereafter, the two delegations met on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and together with the interim Special Representative. All conditions and modalities for the establishment of the Commissions foreseen under the agreement were reviewed. The composition of each Commission was extensively discussed and agreement was finally reached. On 4 November 1992, one month after the signature of the agreement, the interim Special Representative was able to appoint the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, which held its first meeting the same day and appointed the three main subsidiary commissions, the Cease-fire Commission, the Reintegration Commission and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces.

10. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Organization of African Unity. This Commission is chaired by the United Nations. The Cease-fire Commission is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Botswana, Egypt, France, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, and is also chaired by the United Nations. The Cease-fire Commission will have subordinate subcommissions in three regional headquarters and also monitoring groups at the assembly areas. The Reintegration Commission is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Community (EC) and is chaired by the United Nations. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces is composed of government and RENAMO delegations, with representatives of France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The United Nations has not been requested to take part in this commission.

11. The Supervisory and Monitoring Commission will guarantee the implementation of the agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that may arise between the parties and guide and coordinate the activities of the other Commissions. The Cease-fire Commission is responsible for supervising the cease-fire and demobilization. The Reintegration Commission is responsible for the economic

and social reintegration of demobilized military personnel. The Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces is responsible for supervising the formation of the new unified armed forces.

12. All Commissions and their subordinate bodies have been established and have begun their work. However, they will require some technical support, including an impartial secretariat, which could best be provided by ONUMOZ. Legal services will also be necessary in order to ensure that the working procedures of the commissions meet international standards and to resolve possible legal disputes. As the composition of the main commissions is multinational and all decisions need to be recorded, translation, secretarial and information services will be required. As for the regional offices of the Cease-fire Commission, transport facilities will be necessary to enable the commissions to carry out their duties on the spot.

13. Meanwhile, the Government has undertaken military operations to retake the four places seized by RENAMO in mid-October (see para. 6 above). The interim Special Representative has continued to urge the two parties to refrain from any type of military operation and to discuss and settle all disputes in the appropriate commissions.

II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

14. In formulating my recommendations to the Security Council on the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), I have been guided by three fundamental considerations. The first relates to the trust placed in the United Nations by both parties, as well as by the people of Mozambique. The agreement envisages that the United Nations will provide an impartial and supportive structure to help both parties to break the vicious cycle of violence that has caused so much suffering to Mozambique over the years.

15. The second consideration derives from the breadth of the responsibilities entrusted to the United Nations under the agreement. These will require the involvement of the entire international community, especially United Nations programmes and specialized agencies, and also bilateral entities, intergovernmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, all of which can contribute to the rebuilding and development of a peaceful Mozambique.

16. The third consideration relates to the geography of Mozambique and the country's current condition after 14 years of civil war. It covers an area of 800,000 square kilometres. It is elongated in shape, extending about 1,800 km from north to south, 600 km from east to west in the north and 300 km in the south. Its communications have been devastated by the war. It has been afflicted by the worst drought in decades and food is in short supply. There is an abundance of arms and many armed bandits operate outside the control of the armed forces of either side. Several million Mozambicans are internally displaced or are refugees in neighbouring countries.

17. All these factors have to be taken into account in assessing the human and material resources that ONUMOZ will require. An additional factor is the existence of four transport corridors (the Beira, Limpopo, Nacala and Tete corridors, each providing road, rail and/or pipeline links), which run across Mozambique from the Indian Ocean to land-locked countries to the north and west. These corridors are of critical importance to Mozambique itself, to United Nations humanitarian and other operations in southern Africa and to neighbouring countries. As the civil war intensified, Malawi and Zimbabwe, with the Government of Mozambique's agreement, deployed troops in some of the corridors to assist the Government's forces in keeping them open. With the implementation of the agreement's provisions on the assembly and demobilization of the two sides' forces and on the withdrawal of foreign forces, ONUMOZ will have to assume transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors in order to avoid any vacuum that could be exploited by bandits, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces.

III. OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR THE OPERATION

18. In accordance with the agreement, the mandate of ONUMOZ would, if the Security Council agrees, be as follows:

(a) Political: to facilitate impartially the implementation of the agreement, in particular by chairing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate commissions;

(b) Military:

(i) To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;

(ii) To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;

(iii) To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;

(iv) To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and

(v) To provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process, especially in the corridors;

(c) Electoral: to provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process;

(d) Humanitarian: to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population, and, in this context, to chair the Humanitarian Assistance Committee.

19. The operational concept of ONUMOZ is based on the strong interrelationship between the four components of its mandate. Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilization process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process, in turn, requires prompt demobilization and formation of the new armed forces, without which the conditions would not exist for successful elections.

20. These strong linkages require a fully integrated approach and strong coordination by the interim Special Representative. The following description of the activities proposed for ONUMOZ in each of its four areas of responsibility should, therefore, be seen as an indivisible and interdependent operational plan.

IV. OPERATIONAL PLAN FOR UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT

21. The arrangements for the cease-fire and other military aspects of the peace process are set out in detail in protocol IV to the agreement and were highlighted in my report to the Council of 9 October 1992 (S/24642). This role is similar to that entrusted to the United Nations in other recent cases where the Organization has monitored the implementation of a cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection and storage of weapons. In addition, the Cease-fire Commission would also approve plans for dealing with other armed groups, including irregulars, and would authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructure, including the corridors.

22. To ensure credible verification, it would be necessary to obtain from the parties lists of all troops and paramilitary forces, assembled or unassembled, together with details of weapons and ammunition held by them. There would have to be an agreement on the categories of troops that would be temporarily exempted from the requirement to assemble. Their numbers should be strictly limited and regularly verified. The demobilization process would be initiated and vigorously pursued as soon as troops started to assemble. Arrangements would also be needed for ONUMOZ to control weapons and ammunition in possession of the Government and RENAMO. All arms and ammunition not required for the new armed forces would be destroyed under close supervision of the United Nations. A systematic programme for removal of weapons from the civilian population would also be required from the outset.

23. ONUMOZ's verification function would be carried out mainly by teams of United Nations military observers at the 49 assembly areas in 3 military regions and elsewhere in the field. They would work with, but would remain separate from, the monitoring groups composed of representatives of the two parties at each location. They would observe the manner in which those groups

were carrying out their functions in order to verify that the joint monitoring machinery was working effectively. They would respond to requests for assistance and would use their good offices to resolve any problems that might arise within the monitoring groups, conducting their own investigations and patrolling the whole extent of their assembly areas. Teams would also be deployed at airports, ports and other critical areas, including RENAMO headquarters. The security of United Nations personnel would primarily be the responsibility of the parties that controlled the zone where they were present, although in some cases the military observers would be collocated with armed United Nations troops.

24. The military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique would be inescapably linked with the humanitarian effort. The approximately 110,000 soldiers who come to the assembly areas will be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. They will need food and other support as soon as the assembly areas are established, and there should be special provision in the ONUMOZ budget to cover these costs. The refugees and displaced persons who will inevitably gather around the assembly areas will also require food assistance, which will be provided as part of the humanitarian programme. The relief programmes for assembled soldiers and civil populations in the vicinity will need to be closely coordinated, and it will be desirable to avoid population movements towards the assembly areas. Improved accessibility, the demining of roads and the organization of secure transport will be important in this context.

25. An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, will assist the interim Special Representative in the implementation of the demobilization programme and will collaborate closely with UNOHAC (see para. 42 below) on its humanitarian aspects. These will include:

(a) The distribution of food, medicine, health care and other essential services to the assembly areas;

(b) The organization of a database, as well as the issue of personal documents for the demobilized;

(c) The supply of civilian clothing and the organization of transport for the ex-combatants when they leave the assembly areas for their homes;

(d) The establishment of a solid link with the provincial and district authorities responsible for the civilian dimension of the demobilization process.

26. The agreement provides for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be initiated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. Simultaneously, the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, through the Cease-fire Commission, would assume immediate responsibility "for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes", of which the most important are the corridors described in paragraph 17 above. The withdrawal of foreign troops started after the agreement's entry into force, and two teams of United Nations

military observers have been deployed to monitor it. The withdrawal of the remaining foreign troops before alternative security arrangements were in place would leave the corridors at the mercy of roaming groups of heavily armed irregulars. My interim Special Representative has explored several options, but for political and legal reasons, including the clear provisions of the agreement, it would be extremely difficult to extend the presence of the Malawian and Zimbabwean troops.

27. I have given this question much thought. There is an imperative need to continue to ensure the security of the corridors and other key routes and to protect humanitarian convoys using them. There seems to be no alternative but for ONUMOZ to assume this responsibility. For this function it will be necessary to deploy five logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions. In addition, three logistically self-sufficient engineer companies will be needed, supported, as necessary, by mine-clearing and engineering contractors in order to assist in demining and road repair and in the destruction of arms and ammunition not required for the new armed forces. These units must be deployed as rapidly as possible in order to permit early completion of the withdrawal of foreign forces.

28. The following additional elements would be part of ONUMOZ's military component and would provide support to the other components of the mission:

(a) A Headquarters company, including a military police platoon;

(b) A military communications unit to ensure secure communications within the entire mission area for all components of ONUMOZ;

(c) A substantial aviation unit to provide a high degree of air mobility in a devastated country where many of the roads have been made impassable. The aviation unit would be responsible for command and liaison, reconnaissance, investigations, medical evacuation and resupply. It would probably be obtained from commercial sources and would consist of up to 24 rotary and fixed-wing aircraft (utility helicopters, light passenger aircraft, medium passenger/cargo aircraft); additional heavy cargo capacity would be obtained, if needed, on a local charter basis;

(d) A military medical unit to support all ONUMOZ components, including a field hospital and medical evacuation capability. The infantry battalions would include integral medical support;

(e) Three logistic companies, as the conditions in Mozambique make it impossible to rely on a civilian resupply system. Each company would consist of a transport platoon, a supply platoon, a fuel, oil and lubricant platoon and a workshop platoon. One would be located at each of the three regional headquarters;

(f) A movement control company.

V. POSSIBLE MONITORING OF THE POLICE

29. While the agreement does not provide a specific role for United Nations civilian police in monitoring the neutrality of the Mozambican police, experience elsewhere suggests that this could be desirable in order to inspire confidence that violations of civil liberties, human rights and political freedom will be avoided. Throughout the peace process, but particularly during the electoral campaign, the presence of a United Nations police component could be most useful, although agreement on this point was not reached in the Rome negotiations. If agreed by the two sides, such a component could be headed by an Inspector General, and consist of up to 128 police officers, deployed in the regions and provincial capitals. It would work in close cooperation with the National Police Affairs Commission and provide technical advice to this body as required. I believe that such a unit would be a valuable addition to ONUMOZ and I therefore intend to ask my interim Special Representative to reopen this matter with the parties and seek their concurrence.

VI. MONITORING OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE PROVISION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELECTIONS

30. Under the terms of the agreement, legislative and presidential elections will be held simultaneously one year after the date of signature of the agreement. This period may be extended if it is determined that circumstances exist that preclude its observance. In the light of recent experience in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented. It is also important that the peace process should not be drawn out indefinitely. I have therefore asked the interim Special Representative to give the highest priority to timely implementation of the cease-fire, the assembly, disarmament and demobilization of troops, and the formation of the new armed forces.

31. In the agreement, the parties agreed to invite the United Nations and other organizations and private individuals to observe the elections from the start of the electoral campaign until the new Government's assumption of office. They also agreed to seek technical and material assistance from the United Nations. On the day the agreement was signed, President Chissano formally addressed appropriate requests to me on these matters (S/24635).

32. The terms of reference of ONUMOZ's electoral component would be as follows:

(a) To verify the impartiality of the National Elections Commission and its organs in all aspects and stages of the electoral process;

(b) To verify that political parties and alliances enjoy complete freedom of organization, movement, assembly and expression, without hindrance and intimidation;

(c) To verify that all political parties and alliances have fair access to State mass media and that there is fairness in the allocation of both the hour and duration of radio and television broadcasts;

(d) To verify that the electoral rolls are properly drawn up and that qualified voters are not denied identification and registration cards or the right to vote;

(e) To report to the electoral authorities on complaints, irregularities and interferences reported or observed, and, if necessary, to request the electoral authorities to take action to resolve and rectify them, as well as conducting its own independent investigation of irregularities;

(f) To observe all activities related to the registration of voters, the organization of the poll, the electoral campaign, the poll itself and the counting, computation and announcement of the results;

(g) To participate in the electoral education campaign;

(h) To prepare periodic reports on the evolution of the electoral process, that will be submitted to the Secretary-General through his interim Special Representative.

33. The electoral component would prepare independent reports about the conduct of the elections. It would establish a special relationship with the National Elections Commission.

34. In carrying out its mandate to verify the impartiality of the National Elections Commission and its organs, the electoral component would evaluate the criteria for the appointment of electoral authorities at the regional and provincial levels. The fairness of challenged actions or significant decisions at both the national and the provincial levels would be similarly evaluated.

35. In order to verify that political parties and alliances enjoy complete freedom of organization, movement, assembly and expression without hindrance and intimidation, the electoral component would establish offices in each provincial capital, with an adequate number of observer teams at each of them. The latter would establish contact with political parties and social organizations at the national and local levels and would visit villages and municipalities throughout the country. They would attend all important political rallies and other relevant activities, and verify the observance by all parties of the electoral law and any code of conduct that might be agreed between the parties or established by the electoral authorities. This activity would be reinforced by a public information campaign about electoral activities, ONUMOZ's objectives and the mechanisms established.

36. To verify that all political parties and alliances have fair access to State mass media, the electoral component would verify the distribution of broadcasting time between parties, the content of news broadcasts and the

fairness of tariffs. It would also evaluate complaints received on the use of other public resources for political purposes.

37. In carrying out its mandate to verify that the electoral rolls were properly drawn up, the teams would periodically visit registration centres and evaluate complaints received or irregularities observed. The electoral component would accordingly have to be deployed before the beginning of registration.

38. In order to follow up complaints, irregularities and interferences reported or observed, provincial offices would receive complaints and requests presented by political parties or relevant social organizations, analyse their relevance, compile the information on the issues in question and transmit them to the electoral authorities and/or appropriate parties. Significant threats to the fairness of the elections would be carefully investigated and, if necessary, independently reported. A data bank would record the complaints received and analyses of trends would be produced periodically.

39. ONUMOZ would need to include an Electoral Division headed by a Director, with a total of up to 148 international electoral officers (including two consultants), supported by an appropriate number of United Nations volunteers and international and local support staff. It should have the following structure:

(a) The Office of the Director (Maputo): a unit that would provide overall direction to the Electoral Division. It would maintain contacts with the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO and the National Elections Commission and the main political parties;

(b) Three Regional Offices, each headed by a Regional Coordinator in the southern, central and northern regions;

(c) Provincial Offices each headed by a provincial coordinator assisted by a team of up to 10 Electoral Officers.

40. During the polling itself, the Electoral Division would require the services of up to 1,200 international observers. I have asked the interim Special Representative to seek the cooperation of regional organizations, governments and non-governmental organizations who intend to send election observers to Mozambique, in order to minimize the number of additional observers who will have to be deployed by the United Nations. It should also be possible to draw on United Nations and other international personnel who will already be in Mozambique for non-electoral purposes. All observers would have to have full access to all stages of the poll. With their help, the Electoral Division would develop a projection of results for internal purposes.

41. When a country for the first time prepares for multiparty elections, it is crucial that its electoral authorities have adequate access to technical assistance and material support. The planning and execution of voter registration and polling presents a formidable challenge to national electoral

authorities. In Mozambique adequate legal advice, logistical planning and support would be as important as political commitment of the two parties to ensure free and fair elections. A major national as well as international effort would be required. This would encompass a broad range of needs: vehicles, aircraft, communications, voting booths and material, food, tents, salary for registration and electoral brigades. Legal advice on the drafting of an electoral law and technical guidance on the conduct of elections would be especially essential. Technical assistance, if timely, would help to create an orderly and coherent process. In anticipation of the request from the Government referred to in paragraph 31 above, a United Nations technical mission on electoral matters visited Mozambique in September 1992 and established contacts with the Government. It is envisaged that United Nations consultants will continue to cooperate closely with the national electoral authorities.

42. Specific activities of the United Nations in this area will largely occur outside the immediate mandate of ONUMOZ, albeit in close coordination with its electoral component. It is my intention to provide technical assistance to the electoral authorities through the United Nations Development Programme and other existing mechanisms of the United Nations system. These United Nations activities will have to be coordinated closely by my interim Special Representative with those of other intergovernmental bodies, in particular OAU and the European Community, and with bilateral donors. Some of the donors have already sent preparatory teams to the country with a view to elaborating a comprehensive document on electoral support which would be presented to the forthcoming pledging conference in Rome. The United Nations would be ready to play the main coordinating role for the provision of technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique.

VII. PLAN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT

43. The character and scope of the United Nations ongoing humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique require adjustment following the signing of the agreement, in which the parties undertook to facilitate significantly the provision of humanitarian aid to previously inaccessible areas and called on the United Nations to coordinate the provision of all such assistance. Immediately after the signing of the agreement, I accordingly dispatched a humanitarian assistance mission to Mozambique to assess existing United Nations operations in this area and to devise a more effective United Nations response to the intended expansion of humanitarian activities, with emphasis on the development of an appropriate coordination mechanism.

44. As a result, it is my recommendation that ONUMOZ should have a humanitarian component in the form of a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which would be established in Maputo, with suboffices at the regional and provincial levels. It would replace the present office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations. Headed by the Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, and under the

overall authority of my interim Special Representative, it would function as an integrated component of ONUMOZ. To ensure the proper provision and delivery of relief assistance to an expanded beneficiary population in Mozambique, UNOHAC would coordinate the various humanitarian assistance programmes. Operational agencies and the non-governmental aid community would be asked to provide representatives to work within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance.

45. It is estimated that, as a result of both the war and the continuing drought, the internally displaced population in Mozambique totals some 3 to 4 million people. At present, about 3 million Mozambicans living in accessible areas are receiving humanitarian assistance. The signing of the agreement has already created access to additional affected areas, many of which are controlled by RENAMO. As a consequence, nearly 270,000 additional beneficiaries are being provided with humanitarian assistance by the United Nations and by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), under the terms of the Declaration of Rome on the Principles of Humanitarian Assistance of 15 July 1992. Indications are that the number of additional beneficiaries may reach 500,000 in a matter of months.

46. While 1.4 million of the estimated 1.8 million Mozambican refugees living in neighbouring countries receive assistance, the drought is reported to have caused many other Mozambicans to seek refuge there during the past three months. The expected returnee population can thus be estimated at not less than 1.8 million.

47. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance will also make available food and other relief for distribution to the soldiers in the assembly areas by a technical unit of ONUMOZ, as described in section IV above. Subsequently, humanitarian aid would be required for the reintegration of demobilized troops into their communities.

VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ONUMOZ

48. The organizational structure of ONUMOZ would be as follows:

(a) Mission headquarters and the Office of the interim Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Maputo. The Office will consist of an Executive Director, a Special Assistant, a Political Adviser, an Information Officer, a Planning and Analysis Officer, a Legal Adviser and both international and locally recruited support staff;

(b) A Military Component with headquarters in Maputo, which would include a Military Observer group, five infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, three logistic companies, a Headquarters company, a movement control company, a communications unit, a medical unit and an air unit (probably from commercial sources). The military component would be headed by a Force Commander with the rank of Major General. There would be three regional offices, as set out in section IV above;

(c) If the parties agree, a police component in Maputo, headed by a Chief Police Observer, who would hold the rank of Chief Superintendent or its equivalent, with three regional offices and staff outposted in provincial towns, as set out in section V above;

(d) An electoral component in Maputo, with three regional offices and provincial offices, as set out in section VI above;

(e) An Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Maputo, with 3 regional offices and 10 provincial offices, as set out in section VII above;

(f) An administrative component in Maputo, with three regional offices, providing support in the areas of finance, personnel, procurement, communication, travel, compensation, building management, property control, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing and security.

IX. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

49. It is a matter of great satisfaction that an end is at last in sight to the cruel war that has ravaged Mozambique for 14 years. Both the Government and RENAMO deserve to be commended for their statesmanship and diplomatic skill and, above all, for their commitment to their people and their country. I very much hope that in the months ahead they will be guided in their actions by the same spirit of national reconciliation and unity. As the people of Mozambique prepare for democratic multiparty elections, they are starting out on a road that can be either divisive or constructive. It is my fervent hope that the spirit of national unity will also shape the electoral process, and that this will be an opportunity for the people of Mozambique to choose freely the leaders who will jointly work for a better future.

50. The mediators and the observers who have so patiently helped to bring about the agreement also deserve the highest praise. I trust that I can count on their continued political and material support as the peace process evolves.

51. The task which the Government and RENAMO have agreed to ask the United Nations to assume is a large and difficult one. The difficulties derive from the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new tasks arising from the general peace agreement and the complexity of the processes enshrined in the agreement. An additional dimension derives from the critical importance of the Mozambican corridors for so much of southern Africa. To achieve in one year (of which a month and a half have already passed) the assembly, disarmament and demobilization of the two sides' troops, the formation of new armed forces, the resettlement of 5 to 6 million refugees and displaced persons, the provision of humanitarian relief to all parts of the country and the organization and conduct of elections will require a huge and cooperative effort by the Government and RENAMO and by the international community, with the United Nations in the lead.

52. As will be evident from the present report, I feel obliged to recommend that very substantial resources should be made available for this purpose, especially on the military side. This reflects my conviction that it will not be possible in Mozambique to create the conditions for a successful election unless the military situation has been brought fully under control. If the United Nations is to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Mozambicans, what has to be done must be done well, and quickly. But however great the resources the United Nations decides to devote to Mozambique, the general peace agreement will not be implemented unless the Mozambican parties make a determined effort in good faith to honour their commitments. The efforts of the United Nations can only be in support of theirs. In the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recommendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international community to take a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists.

53. On this basis, I recommend to the Security Council that it approve the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ as set out in the present report, and in particular that it agree to:

(a) The establishment of an Office of the interim Special Representative for Mozambique, with up to 12 international Professional staff, 8 international support staff and an adequate number of locally recruited staff;

(b) The deployment of a military component consisting of a Headquarters company and military police platoon; 354 military observers; 5 logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions, each composed of up to 850 personnel; 1 engineer battalion, with contracted assistance as needed; 3 logistic companies; and air, communications, medical and movement control support units;

(c) The deployment of a civilian technical unit to support the logistic tasks relating to the demobilization programme in the assembly areas, with adequate resources;

(d) The deployment, subject to the concurrence of the parties, of 128 police officers to monitor civil liberties and to provide technical advice to the National Police Affairs Commission;

(e) The deployment of an Electoral Division consisting of up to 148 international electoral officers and support staff, from the start of the electoral component of the peace process, followed by the deployment of up to 1,200 international observers for the elections themselves and the periods immediately preceding and following them;

(f) The deployment of 16 international Professional staff to enable the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance within the regions and provinces of Mozambique;

(g) The deployment of up to 28 international Professional staff, up to 100 United Nations Volunteers, up to 124 international support staff and an adequate number of local staff, to provide secretariat functions and administrative support to the military, police (if confirmed), electoral and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ, as well as to the commissions chaired by the United Nations.

54. Preliminary cost estimates for ONUMOZ are contained in an addendum to the present report which is being circulated separately.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ)

Corrigendum

1. Page 1, paragraph 1, line 1

   The symbol should read S/24642

2. Page 7, paragraph 25

   The first sentence should read

   An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, will assist the interim Special Representative in the implementation of the demobilization programme and will collaborate closely with a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) (see para. 44 below) on its humanitarian aspects.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE (ONUMOZ)

Addendum

1. As stated in paragraph 54 of my main report (S/24892), I indicated that an addendum to the report would be issued which would contain preliminary cost estimates related to the establishment and deployment of a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

2. Based on the operational plan and general assumptions outlined in my main report, it is estimated that an amount of $331.8 million would be required for the period from inception to 31 October 1993. This amount includes the costs of start-up and acquisition of capital equipment. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main objects of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that, should the Security Council agree to the establishment and deployment of ONUMOZ, the cost relating thereto should be considered as an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessment to be levied on Member States be credited to a special account to be established for this purpose.

Annex

Cost estimates by objects of expenditure

(For the period from inception to 31 October 1993)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Objects of expenditure		
1.	Military component	
	(a) Observers	19 900
	(b) Contingent personnel	97 000
	(c) Other costs pertaining to contingents	41 100
2.	Civilian police	6 900
3.	Civilian staff costs	59 700
4.	Premises, rental and maintenance	35 200
5.	Vehicle operations	11 000
6.	Air operations	26 900
7.	Communications and other equipment	11 900
8.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight and support costs	11 200
9.	Programme related to former combatants in the assembly areas	11 000
	Total	331 800